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from Stockholm

Chronological Account of Wallenberg Case since 1957

1. In 1957, the Foreign Ministry published a collection of documents along with commentaries concerning Raoul Wallenberg's captivity in the Soviet Union. The material was made public after the reply in the matter had been received which had been promised by the Soviet Government during Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March/April 1956. The reply, which was received in the form of a memorandum on February 6, 1957, implied in the main that the Soviet Government, because of the discovery of a document from the Ljubljanskaya Prison in Moscow, was of the opinion, first, that there was reason for looking upon this document as referring to Wallenberg, and, second, that the conclusion ought to be drawn from the content of the document that Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaya Prison in July 1947.
2. On account of the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957, a Swedish note of reply was transmitted on February 19, 1957, in which it was stated, inter alia, that Swedish public opinion was rightly disturbed by what had occurred in the matter. The Swedish Government found it difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's confinement to Soviet prisons other than the report referred to in the Soviet Government's memorandum would be wholly extinct. The Government therefore expected that if additional material should come to light in the Soviet Union which could clarify what had happened to Wallenberg, this would be communicated to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Swedish Government for its part reserved the right to make available any additional material concerning Wallenberg which the Swedish Government judged to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.
3. The Swedish note of February 19, 1957, was replied to by the Soviet Government through a note of April 17, 1957, which was handed to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim by Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov. It was stated in the note of reply that the Soviet memorandum of February 6, 1957, had given all the information which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive investigation concerning Wallenberg carried out by the competent Soviet authorities. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Government unfortunately was not in possession of any further information whatsoever. The content of the Soviet note was made public through a press release of April 23, 1957.
4. It was clear to the Swedish Government that also henceforth all existing or new clues would have to be tested. The continued search, which was conducted with the same exactitude and along the same principles as the earlier investigations concerning Wallenberg's stay in the Ljubljanskaya and Lefortovskaya prisons, indicated that Wallenberg some time after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir, situated northeast of Moscow. At the beginning of 1959, the work on the collection of the new material of evidence had proceeded far enough to provide the

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foundation for a new representation by the Swedish Government. This was given the form of a note which was submitted by Ambassador Sohlman to Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov on February 9, 1959 (Appendix A). By way of introduction, it is recalled in the note that the Swedish Government in its note of February 19, 1957 had reserved the right to make additional material available to the Soviet Government. The Swedish authorities had continued to test all clues bearing upon Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. There had then come to the knowledge of the Swedish authorities a number of testimonies by persons having returned from Soviet captivity of the implication that Wallenberg after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir. These testimonies, independent of each other, had all been obtained from direct contact between the persons in question and Swedish official representatives. The note concluded with the request that the Soviet Government make a prompt investigation for the purpose of determining whether Wallenberg had been staying in the Vladimir prison.

5. The Soviet reply to this request was received on March 6, 1959 (Appendix B). It was stated in the reply that the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 had contained all the information which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive control, and led to the conclusion that Wallenberg died in July 1947. The reply concluded with the declaration that a renewed investigation, made in accordance with the Swedish Government's wish, had not brought to light any new facts in the matter. The information mentioned in the Swedish note about Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

In response to press inquiries, the Foreign Ministry on May 28, 1959, published a communiqué concerning this exchange of notes (Appendix C).

6. During the spring and summer of 1959 preparations were in progress for the eventually cancelled return visit to Sweden by Minister President KHRUSHCHEV which had been scheduled for August 1959. The Swedish Government informed the Soviet Embassy on May 8 that the Wallenberg affair would be brought up during the negotiations in connection with the visit.

7. On June 27, 1959, the Soviet Foreign Ministry made an oral statement to Ambassador Sohlman in reply to a letter which Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. Maj von Dardel, had written to Minister President Khrushchev. It was requested in the statement that Mrs. von Dardel be referred to the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 (Appendix D).

8. Irrespective of the negative Soviet replies, the Swedish representation of February 9, 1959, was followed up through the delivery on July 17, 1959 of a summary of the main testimonies which formed part of the Swedish material concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir (Appendix E).

9. As is also seen from the communications exchanged during June and July 1959, the Swedish press particularly during the month of May 1959 carried a large number of articles on the Wallenberg case. In this connection

the Foreign Ministry as already stated issued a press communiqué on May 28, 1959, concerning the exchange of notes which had taken place earlier in the year. During the latter half of 1959 and in early 1960 there were also numerous articles in the press which caused inquiries to be made to the Ministry. On January 23, 1960, a new press release was issued (Appendix F), in which it was stated anew that the Swedish authorities were carefully testing all existing and newly incoming clues in the Wallenberg affair and that nothing new was to be added at that time over and beyond what had been accounted for in the press communiqué of May 28, 1959.

10. In the collection of documents of 1957 concerning the Wallenberg affair an account was given of the study of the then available material of evidence about Wallenberg's confinement to prison in the Soviet Union which had been made by former Justices of the Supreme Court Eklund and Lind. The work by the two Justices led to a written report which was submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on March 10, 1956, as part of the material which at that time was made available by Sweden to the Soviet authorities. A corresponding study of the material which had transpired in support of the fact that Wallenberg had been in the Soviet Union after July 1947 and had then been confined to prison in Vladimir was made on the Ministry's orders by former Justices of the Supreme Court Gyllensvärd and Santesson. They stated in a report dated April 25, 1960, that in their opinion the investigation at hand, although not including full evidence in this respect, must under Swedish law be considered as making likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least in the early 1950's and had then been in prison in Vladimir (Appendix G).

11. Throughout this period, efforts were being made to elaborate the evidence as the basis for a renewed démarche to the Soviet Government. An important new testimony appeared in January 1961 in connection with a visit to Moscow by Professor Nanna Svartz. In a conversation with a prominent Soviet scientist she had, in response to a direct question, received the reply that the latter knew about Wallenberg, who was "in a very poor condition" and mentally ill. After Professor Svartz' informant had summoned a colleague, she had been given the advice by the latter to get in touch with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister SEMJONOV -- whom Professor Svartz had said she had known for a long time -- to seek permission for Wallenberg to be brought home -- "if he is still alive".

Professor Svartz in a memorandum has given an account of this conversation and of her subsequent contacts in Moscow.

12. Professor Svartz, who had tried in vain to see Deputy Foreign Minister Semjonov personally in Moscow, quickly informed the Swedish Government about what had happened. Following thorough considerations within the Cabinet, Prime Minister ERLANDER addressed a letter directly to Minister President Khrushchev containing a request that a Swedish physician be allowed immediately to travel to Moscow to decide in consultation with his Soviet colleagues the manner of transportation, medical care, etc.,

in connection with a repatriation of Wallenberg to Sweden (Appendix H). The letter, which was dated February 9, 1961, was delivered on February 25, 1961, by Ambassador Sohlman at a personal call on Minister President Khrushchev. The latter, who had been informed in advance that the conversation would concern the Wallenberg affair, immediately and categorically declared that he had nothing new to add to the information given previously.

13. Professor Svartz for her part made various efforts to renew contact with her colleagues in Moscow. During a visit to Moscow in March 1961, at which she again met with her informant, she reverted to the question about Wallenberg. The informant then maintained that Professor Svartz had misunderstood him. He declared that prior to their conversation in January he had known nothing about Wallenberg.

After some time had past without any written reply to Prime Minister Erlander's letter having been received, Ambassador Sohlman was instructed to express to the Soviet Foreign Ministry an earnest expectation that such a reply would soon be delivered. This oral reminder was made on July 10, 1961. The Foreign Ministry then asserted that a reply to the letter had already been made, to which Ambassador Sohlman rejoined that Prime Minister Erlander after a written representation of this nature felt he had the right to expect a written reply.

14. During the months following this reminder, which neither led to any reply from the Soviet Government, the possibility was considered of seeking to find response from the highest Soviet quarters to the Swedish representations via Professor Svartz' Soviet contacts. In May 1962, Professor Svartz was invited to attend a medical congress in Moscow and then met anew with her original informant. The latter, however, rejected any conversation about Wallenberg and referred her to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

15. In connection with Soviet Ambassador GUSEV's transfer from Stockholm he was summoned to call on Prime Minister Erlander on August 17, 1962, and was asked upon his return to Moscow to forward to the Soviet Government and to Minister President Khrushchev personally a message containing an urgent appeal for a positive treatment of the Swedish representations concerning Wallenberg (Appendix I). Not even this new representation caused any reply from the Soviet Union.

16. After Foreign Minister Nilsson had been invited by Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO to pay a visit to Moscow in May 1963, the Foreign Ministry on April 17 informed the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Foreign Minister had no concrete questions that he wished to bring up during his visit, with one exception, namely, the question about Wallenberg's fate.

At his first talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko on May 8, 1963, Foreign Minister NILSSON reminded him of Prime Minister Erlander's representations and declared that he wished to take up the question with

Minister President Khrushchev. Foreign Minister Gromyko firmly advised against such a step which in his opinion must be entirely fruitless since there was nothing new to say in the matter. After Foreign Minister Nilsson on May 16 had been informed that time for a meeting with the Minister President had been set for the following day, he immediately confirmed to Foreign Minister Gromyko his previously declared intention to take up the Wallenberg question with the Minister President. This was also done at the meeting which took place on May 17, 1963. Foreign Minister Nilsson then referred to, among other things, Professor Svartz' testimony, and addressed an urgent appeal to the Minister President for assistance in clarifying Wallenberg's fate. The Minister President declared that if Wallenberg had existed he would have been returned to Sweden. He regretted that he had nothing to add over and beyond what had previously been told by the Soviet Government.

17. During Foreign Minister Gromyko's return visit to Sweden at the middle of March 1964 there was a conversation between him and Prime Minister Erlander which was devoted almost exclusively to the Wallenberg affair. The Prime Minister pointed to the great importance of the affair to Swedish-Soviet relations and requested that the Soviet Government make a further attempt to trace Wallenberg's fate, under the guidance of available information. He also proposed that a meeting be arranged between Professor Svartz and her informant, to gain further clarity about that testimony. Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union, that no further trace had been found after him, and that nothing was to be added. Professor Svartz' testimony must depend on some misunderstanding. The Soviet scientist in question had categorically denied that he had spoken the way it had been alleged. Perhaps he would be prepared himself to make a declaration to Professor Svartz to this effect.

Some time after this conversation, Professor Svartz received a letter from her informant, dated April 29, 1964. In his letter he stated that at the conversation in January 1961 he had said that he knew nothing about Wallenberg, had never heard his name, and had not the slightest idea whether or not he was alive. The content of this letter as well as Professor Svartz' reply by letter of May 28, 1964, are accounted for in Professor Svartz' memorandum.

18. In an interpellation on March 3, 1964, Mr. OHLIN asked Foreign Minister Nilsson whether he would provide the Riksdag with an account of the development of the Wallenberg affair since the publication of the Foreign Ministry's White Paper of 1957 -- in so far as certain information must not be kept secret for special reasons -- and also give information on what measures the Government planned to take to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity of a more effective search for Wallenberg and his whereabouts during different periods after the war.

The Foreign Minister's reply was given in the Riksdag on April 3, 1964 (Appendix J). It was stated in the reply, among other things, that the Government had sought to exploit every suitable possibility to underscore

to the Soviet authorities the importance of having clarity achieved concerning Wallenberg's fate. However, the material which in recent years had been presented to the Soviet authorities and the details of the representations which had been made were not of a character to make it possible to make them public in this connection. Yet, all representations had been met by the Soviet Government with the reply that there was nothing to add beyond what had previously been stated by the Soviet Government. In conclusion, Foreign Minister Nilsson confirmed that the Swedish Government did not look upon Wallenberg's cause as being finished but would continue its efforts to create clarity about his fate.

19. On account of Minister President Khrushchev's impending visit to Sweden, Ambassador JARRING had a conversation in Moscow on May 26, 1964, with the chief of the Scandinavian Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, KOVALJOV. During this conversation, the Swedish request was advanced anew that the Soviet Government make a new investigation in the Wallenberg affair. With reference to this conversation, Ambassador Jarring was summoned on June 11, 1964, to call on Deputy Foreign Minister ORLOV and then received an oral statement as follows:

The Soviet authorities had carried out the most minute investigation in the Wallenberg case because of the conversation with Kovaljov. The result of this investigation was the same as had been presented in the memorandum of February 8, 1957, in which the circumstances of Wallenberg's death had been stated. There were no further circumstances whatsoever that could bring about any news in this matter. The assertions by some persons that Wallenberg was supposed to have been alive after 1947 were either due to mistakes, or else they reflected the efforts of certain circles to complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. Wallenberg had not, after 1947, been in any hospital, any prison, or in any other place. For the part of the Soviet Union, there was no doubt whatsoever that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947, in the Ljubljanskaya Prison. Since all possibilities for investigating Wallenberg's fate had consequently been completely exhausted, the Soviet Government saw no further reason for engaging itself any longer in this question. Any return to a discussion on this regrettable fact belonging to the past could only cause harm to Swedish-Soviet relations.

20. During Minister President Khrushchev's official visit to Sweden on June 22-27, 1964, the Wallenberg affair was brought up by the Swedish Government on several occasions. The main discussion took place during a private conversation between Prime Minister Erlander and Minister President Khrushchev, in the presence of Foreign Minister Nilsson and Minister PALME, immediately after the governmental negotiations on June 23, 1964.

Prime Minister Erlander underscored the great importance which was attached on the Swedish side to the Wallenberg question, and pointed to the necessity of at last bringing about clarity on this outstanding question in order to create thereby better relations between the two countries.

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The Prime Minister thereafter gave an account of Professor Svartz' testimony, and stressed the great confidence which he personally had in her. The Swedish Government was aware of the fact that the Soviet scientist had asserted that there had been a misunderstanding. Since there were thus two contradictory opinions on what had occurred, it would be necessary to arrange a meeting between the two scientists in order to gain clarity.

Minister President Khrushchev reacted with a declaration that he could not have imagined that the Wallenberg question would be brought up anew by the Swedish Government. He declared that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. This he had already sharply made clear to Ambassador Sohlman. The Swedish Government must realize that the Soviet Union naturally would extradite Wallenberg if he was alive, irrespective of his physical or mental status. The Soviet Union had extradited and repatriated all sorts of people. What interest would the Soviet Union have in keeping Wallenberg? Professor Svartz' statement was founded on sheer misunderstanding. Her Soviet informant had never heard Wallenberg mentioned, had never heard anything about the Wallenberg affair; he was not aware of the exchange of letters which had taken place between the two Governments. It must all be a misunderstanding because of poor knowledge of a foreign language. As far as the Soviet Government was concerned the matter was finished. If there was a desire to arrange a meeting between the two scientists through private channels, the Soviet Government would not make any objections. When the Prime Minister immediately seized upon this statement, the Minister President declared that the Soviet Government neither recommended nor advised against such a confrontation.

The Minister President added that many deeply tragic things had happened during the STALIN period. One could not expect of him to account for the Stalin period. He did not wish to expose himself to this interrogation, with a number of questions which had been replied to long ago. The Soviet Government had made extensive investigations and had given clear replies concerning Wallenberg, and yet the Swedish Government did not seem to rely on them.

Prime Minister Erlander emphasized that he had wished to take this opportunity to discuss, openly and in confidence, a question of considerable importance to the relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Swedish public opinion would certainly find it very difficult to understand why the Soviet Government objected to further investigations in order to seek clarity.

At private conversations with the Minister President later during his visit Prime Minister Erlander repeatedly reverted to the question and further developed the Swedish views. Nothing new in point of fact transpired then. The Minister President declared himself to be sincerely sorry that the Soviet Government did not have access to any material whereby this regrettable subject of contention between the Soviet Union and Sweden could be brought to an end.

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In a special Swedish statement on the Wallenberg question which was made public at the Prime Minister's press conference on June 26, 1964, it was said that the Soviet Government had held to its earlier declaration that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. The Swedish Government felt deep disappointment that the Soviet Government had not felt itself capable of doing anything more in this matter. Despite the fact that the many representations made by the Government after the reply made by the Soviet Government in 1957 had been fruitless, the Swedish Government would not give up its efforts (Appendix K).

21. During the months immediately following upon Minister President Khrushchev's visit, various possibilities were considered for bringing about through private channels, for example through the agency of different scientists, a meeting between Professor Svartz and her Soviet informant. However, these efforts did not produce any result.

22. Minister President KOSYGIN took office in October 1964. In early 1965 a representation was addressed to him on the Wallenberg question. This was done in the form of a letter from Prime Minister Erlander dated February 11, 1965. Following a summary of the earlier treatment of the case, and with reference to, among other things, the testimonies according to which Wallenberg had been alive in the Soviet Union at a considerably later date than the stated year of death 1947, in prison in Vladimir as well as in a Soviet hospital, the letter concluded with an appeal to the Minister President that he personally bring about such a testing of all phases of the affair in question and of the information made available by the Swedish Government as to make it possible to gain clarity (Appendix L).

The letter was delivered by Ambassador Jarring at a call on Minister President Kosygin on March 22, 1965. The latter then declared that he had carefully read the Soviet file on Wallenberg. He could not arrive at any conclusion other than that shown by the investigations, namely, that Wallenberg was not alive but died in prison in Moscow under the circumstances and at the time as stated in the file. A reply to this effect would be made to the Prime Minister's representation.

With regard to Professor Svartz' testimony, the Minister President declared that the Soviet scientist had never made the statements attributed to him by Professor Svartz. He had no objection to Ambassador Jarring himself having this confirmed at a personal meeting with the scientist.

23. Such a meeting with the Soviet scientist was brought about on May 11, 1965. During this conversation, which took place in the presence of a representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the informant confirmed to Ambassador Jarring that Professor Svartz had had a long talk with him in January 1961 concerning their common scientific problems and interests. In conclusion, she had said she wished to take up with him privately a humanitarian case which concerned a Swedish citizen who was being held in

captivity in the Soviet Union, and she had asked for help to have the latter released. Professor Svartz had mentioned the name of the man, but the informant had at that time never heard this name and had no idea about whom it concerned. He had recommended Professor Svartz to address herself to high quarters in the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Jarring recalled that Professor Svartz had said she had learnt from her informant that Wallenberg was alive but in poor condition and was in hospital. The informant denied the correctness of this information and declared that it was inconceivable to him how Professor Svartz could have misinterpreted him so completely. Perhaps it was due to the fact that his knowledge of the German language -- in which their conversation had been held -- was not so good. Because of this, Professor Svartz could have interpreted words like "if he is alive" or "if he is sick" not as conditional sentences but as statements of fact.

Ambassador Jarring replied that two testimonies stood against each other. He said he believed that it would be of great use if a meeting could be arranged between the informant, Professor Svartz and himself, where an opportunity was given jointly to discuss the matter. The informant declared that he failed to understand what purpose such a meeting would serve, but in the end, in reply to a direct question, he declared that he would be prepared to participate.

24. At a visit to Prime Minister Erlander on May 13, 1965, Soviet Ambassador BELOKHVOSTIKOV advised that on account of the Prime Minister's letter to Minister President Kosygin of February 11, 1965, he had been instructed to state that the Soviet Government in its note of February 6, 1957, had made it clear that Wallenberg died in 1947. The investigations which had now been made had confirmed that this was the case. Professor Svartz' testimony must be founded on a misunderstanding.

Prime Minister Erlander said he intended to take up the question during his impending visit to Moscow. He pointed out that the Soviet Government must realize that the Swedish Government attached extraordinary importance to the affair and that Swedish public opinion demanded an account of it.

25. During Prime Minister Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union on June 10-17, 1965, the Wallenberg question was taken up at the governmental negotiations held on June 11 and June 17. By way of introduction, the Prime Minister said he wished to establish that bilateral Swedish-Soviet relations were favorable short of the fact that the Wallenberg question had not yet been solved. The Prime Minister then summarized in three points the further information and replies from the Soviet Government which he desired.

a) The Soviet reply of 1957 cited the existence of a notation concerning a person by the name of Wallenberg, dead in July 1947, which it was considered there was reason to look upon as referring to Raoul Wallenberg. It seemed to appear from later statements by the Soviet Government as if this assumption has now become a certainty. It was

important for the Swedish Government to be given access to the investigations which had been made in recent years and which had obviously led to this change.

b) Soviet views on and possibly counter-evidence against the testimonies which have been made by prisoners of war who have returned from the Soviet Union and according to which Wallenberg had been in prison in Vladimir after 1947. These testimonies had been studied by prominent Swedish jurists, who had come to the conclusion that, even if full evidence was ^{not} at hand, it is likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least at the beginning of the 1950's and had then been in prison in Vladimir.

c) Professor Svartz' testimony concerning her conversation in Moscow with a Soviet scientist in early January 1961 had been stated by the latter as being due to misunderstanding. This question must be clarified.

The discussion at the two negotiations came to deal mainly with these Swedish demands. Minister President Kosygin stated that after receipt of the Prime Minister's letter he had ordered a new investigation. He had received documents giving the day of death and information that Wallenberg was cremated and was not alive. The Swedish Government had been informed of this. There existed no further material and no personal file on Wallenberg. Why it was not known. Nor were there any Soviet witnesses. If Wallenberg was alive he would be found very soon. It was known who were in prisons and in hospitals. A Chief of Government could soon find a living man but not a dead one. How could the Swedish Government seriously believe that the Soviet authorities were keeping Wallenberg in the Soviet Union? Why should they keep him? The Minister President said he realized that the matter was a difficult and complicated one for the Swedish Government and for Wallenberg's family. However, the Soviet Government had done everything and had no more to add.

The testimonies by the repatriated prisoners of war had no bearing. Professor Svartz' informant had declared that he had never heard of Wallenberg and that the misunderstanding must be due to language difficulties. The Prime Minister's request for a meeting between Professor Svartz and her informant, the Minister President said, he was prepared to comply with, even though he considered the measure meaningless.

In the course of the continued exchange of views, both sides reverted to the stands already cited. The Minister President dwelt at length on the conditions which prevailed during the war and the time immediately thereafter. The Prime Minister repeated with sharpness the demand that exhaustive material be made available to shed light on the question in its entirety. The purpose was to have a complete account on all the points where there was great obscurity at an impartial study. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction that the Minister President had endorsed a meeting for Professor Svartz, but regretted that the replies to his other requests had been negative.

26. In accordance with what had thus been agreed during Prime Minister Erlander's official visit, a conversation took place in Moscow on July 6,

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1965, between Professor Svartz and her informant. Present without taking part in the conversation were Ambassador Jarring and two officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, of whom the one served as interpreter. The exchange of views, which is accounted for in detail in Professor Svartz' memorandum, ended in that statement stood against statement.

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